DAVIDSON AND OTHERS vs. SMITH.
RECENT AMERICAN

DECISIONS.

In the District Court of the United States for the District of
'Wisconsin.
ALFRED W. DAVIDSON AND OTHERS VS. JOHN S. SMITH.

1. State insolvent laws have no.force beyond the limits of the State, except such as
may be given them by comity. But where a contract was made between parties
resident in a State, in the shape of a promissory note, on which a judgment was
obtained in the same State by the endorsees against the maker, which judgment
was sued on in the United States Court for another State by the same plaintiffs,
-who are citizens ofthe last-mentioned State, and ajudgment was rendered thereon,
and afterwards the defendant was discharged, under the insolvent laws of the
State of the contract, the discharge may be pleaded in bar of an action upon the
last judgment.

The opinion of the Court was delivered by
MILLER, J.-This action is founded on a record of a judgment
rendered in the Circuit Court of the United States for the Northern
District of the State of Illinois, at July term, 1855, against the
defendant, as a citizen of the State of Wisconsin, and in favor of the
plaintiffs as citizens of Illinois. That suit was upon a record of a
judgment in favor of the plaintiffs against the defendant, rendered
in September, 1854, in the Supreme Court of the State of New
York for the county of Chautauque.
The defendant pleads in bar, that the judgment of the Court of
the State of New York was founded on his promissory note, made
to one Oliver Patch, or order, in the State of New York, and payable
in the city of' New York, and that Patch endorsed the note to the
plaintiffs. That at the time of making the note and of the rendition of the first judgment, he (the defendant) and Patch were
inhabitants and residents of the State of New York. That in the
month of March, 1857, the defendant presented his petition to the
county court of the county of Wyoming, in the State of New
York, for his discharge as an insolvent debtor, in pursuance of the
statute law of that State; and that he was thereupon discharged,
and he made an assignment by record of the Court, in the month
of May following. In his schedules, he returned these plaintiffs as
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creditors living in the city of Chicago, State of Illinois, by a judgment rendered in the Circuit Court of the United States for the
Northern District of Illinois, on a judgment rendered in the Court
of Chautauque county, in the State of New York, upon his note to
Oliver Patch, of New York, and payable in that State. And as
the judgment in the declaration mentioned was rendered prior to
the discharge, the defendant-prays judgment if the plaintiffs ought
further to maintain this action. To the plea, the plaintiffs demurred,
in which the defendant joined.
The original debt was contracted by a promissory note, between
parties in the State of New York, and payable in that State. The
endorsees of the note recovered a judgment against the maker, in a
Court of that State ; and in a suit on that judgment record, they,
as citizens of the State of Illinois, recovered a judgment in the Circuit Court of the United States, in Illinois, against the defendant,
who was afterwards discharged, and made an assignment as an insolvent debtor, as a resident of the State of New York, under a law of
that State, returning, in the schedule, the plaintiffs as residents of
the State of Illinois.
In the absence of uniform laws on the subject of bankruptcies, throughout the United States, under the Constitution, the effect
to be given discharges, under insolvent laws of the States, is a question of embarrassment to the courts and of interest to parties. The
courts of the several States uniformly carry out their own laws, and
between some of the States a comity is observed. For these reasons, decisions of the courts of the States, in regard to their own
laws, or in observance of an existing comity, afford but little aid in
the determination of the question presented by the pleadings. Decisions of the courts of the United States must be my guide, if I can
ascertain them with sufficient certainty. The subject under consideration appropriately belongs to those courts, as it relates to the
rights of citizens of different States.
It is understood that, by the insolvent laws of the State of New
York, a debt is discharged where the contract was made within the
State; or where the contract was to be performed within the State;
or where the creditor, at the time of the first publication of notice,
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was a resident of the State. Under that law, the Supreme Court
of the State held, that the discharge of a defendant from the payment of his debts is an absolute bar to a recovery upon a contract,
made and to be executed within the State; although the creditor be
a non-resident of the State, and neither united in the application for
the discharge nor accepted a dividend of the assets. And if such
discharge be granted, after a judgment on the contract, the debtor
will be relieved on motion, and a perpetual stay of proceeding on
the judgment will be granted, the plaintiff being at the time a resident of another State. Parkison vs. Scoville, 19 Wendell, 150.
That decision literally carried out the statute law of the State.
There is no question but if the note had been held by the payee,
or if these plaintiffs had resided in the State of New York, at the
date of the discharge, and had not previously obtained a judgment,
in the Circuit Court of the United States in Illinois, the defendant would be released from the debt. The release of the debt by
the insolvent discharge is the only matter for consideration ; the
question of lien of either of the judgment is not in the case. The
plaintiffs sue upon the judgment record simply as an evidence of debt.
In the case of Burt vs. Smith, (this defendant,) which was a suit
upon a judgment record from a court of this State, which was
founded on a judgment record from the State of New York, the
Court adjudged the discharge binding on the plaintiff, as he was, at
the date of the discharge, a resident of the State of New York, and
as a creditor had joined in the petition to the Court for the discharge.
In Clay vs. Smith, 3 Peters 411, the plaintiff, a non-resident of the
State where the discharge was ordered, having received from the
assignee a dividend of the assets, it was held that he was thereby
concluded.
In Ogden vs. Saunders, 12 Wheaton, 213, it is decided that an
insolvent law of a State, which discharges a party from his debts
subsequently contracted, does not impair the obligation of future
contracts between its citizens; but it cannot affect the rights of
creditors, who are citizens of other States. The question in that
case, as determined by the Court, was, whether a discharge of a
debtor, under a State law, was valid against a creditor, a citizen of
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another State, who had never voluntarily subjected himself to the
State laws otherwise than by the origin of the contract. The debt
had been contracted in the State of New York, where Ogden was
discharged, the plaintiff residing in the State of Kentucky. Since
the decision of that case, the constitutionality of State insolvent
laws as to future debts has not been questioned in the Supreme
Court of the United States; and the principle there decided, as to
non-resident creditors, has been steadily maintained. In Boyle vs.
Zacharie, 6 Peters 635, the debt was a contract of the State of
Louisiana, and Zacharie, the creditor, resided in that State; Boyle,
the debtor, resided in the State of Maryland, and was discharged
under the insolvent laws of that State. It was held that the discharge in the State of Maryland did not affect this creditor. In
Clark's Executors vs. Van .Reimsdyke, 9 Cranch, 153, it is decided
that a discharge, under the law of Rhode Island, will not protect a
debtor against a debt contracted in a foreign country. And in
Cook vs. faffit, 5 Howard, 295, the Supreme Court adhere to their
previous decisions, and decide that a contract made or to be performed in the State of New York, with a resident of that State, is
not affected by a discharge of the debtor in the State of Maryland,
where the debtor resided. That case was decided in the Circuit
Court of the United States for the district of Maryland, the State
in which the insolvent discharge was made, and the judgment was
affirmed in the Supreme Court. Taney, 0. J., in his opinion, says,
that he ruled the case in the Circuit Court, in obedience to the decisions of the Supreme Court; and he remarks: "I cannot see how
such laws can be regarded as a violation of the Constitution of the
United States. For bankrupt laws, in the nature of things, can
have no force or operation beyond the limits of the State or nation
by which they were passed, except by the comity of other States or
nations. According to established principles of jurisprudence, such
laws have always been held valid and binding within the territorial
limits of the State by which they are passed, although they may act
upon contracts made in another country, or upon the citizens of
another nation. And they have never been considered, on this
account, an infringement of the rights of other nations, or their
citizens.
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"But, beyond the limits of the State, they have no force, except
such as may be given them by comity. If, therefore, a State may
pass a bankrupt law, in the fair and ordinary exercise of such a
power, it would seem to follow that it would be valid and binding,
not only upon the courts of the State but, also, upon the courts of
the United States, when sitting in the State and administering justice according to its laws, and that, in the tribunals of other States,
it should receive the respect and comity which the established usages
of civilized nations extend to the bankrupt laws of each other."
From these remarks, it is apparent that the Chief Justice, in the
Circuit Court for Maryland, would have considered the insolvent
discharge in that State effectual against the non-resident creditor,
if he had not been bound by the adjudications of the Supreme Court
of the United States. In that case Mr. Justice Daniel and Mr. Justice Woodbury held, that the bankrupt law of a State is a law of the
contract and enters into it, and that the lex loci contractus must
govern. The position of Justice Woodbury is, "That such laws are
to be regarded as if part of the contract incorporated into it, being
construed according to the lex loci contractu8, should be discharged
by a certificate of bankruptcy given to the obligor in the State
where the contract was made and was to be performed; and this,
whether the action on it was brought in that State or another, or in
the courts of the United States; and whether the obligor resides
in that State or elsewhere, is considered as a part of the contract
itself, it is inseparable from it, and follows it into all hands and all
places." Justice Story, in Le Roy vs. Crowinshield,2 Mason, 175,
and in Story's Conflict of Laws, sec. 351, seems to favor this position. If this position were tenable, I should not have much difficulty in disposing of the question under consideration, but I am not
disposed to adopt it as a controlling principle. These several positions of Chief Justice Taney and Justices Daniel and Woodbury are
merely cited as modern principles, in regard to discharges under
State insolvent laws. And in the reports of the Supreme Court of
the United States, it will appear that the Justices, from time to time,
varied in their opinions of those laws, from considering them as laws
impairing the obligation of a contract in the sense of the Constitution
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of the United States, to the extreme positions above cited. But,
however they may have differed in their opinions, the law of the
Court is, that an action of a non-resident plaintiff is not barred by a
plea of discharge under a State insolvent law, unless he has abandoned his ex-territorial immunity, by voluntarily subjecting himself
to the State laws, otherwise than by the origin of the contract.
The question now to be considered is, whether these plaintiffs abandoned this immunity by obtaining the judgments against the defendant in the State of New York?
A judgment is the sentence of the law, pronounced by a court,
upon the matter contained in the record. It is a debt of record ;
and, in many respects, is distinguished from a contract. The omission of a joint debtor, in a suit on contract, must be taken advantage of by a plea in abatement; but in a suit on a judgment record,
such omission may be demurred to ; Gilman vs. 1?ives, 10 Peters,
298. A suit on a judgment record is considered in the nature of a
scire facias to revive a judgment. A judgment record is not evidence of a new contract, but is a debt of record founded on the original contract. At common law a judgment in a personal action
could only be revived by a suit, until the scire facia8 was allowed by
the statute of Westminster, 2 chap. 45. Debt lies on a judgment
record, upon the principle of a contract implied in law. lNul tiel
record is the only plea of the general issue; but payment, or release,
in fact or law, may be specially pleaded, the same as to a scire
facias. The action of debt on a foreign judgment is an original and
independent action; but the defense is the same as to a suit on a
domestic judgment, or to a scire facias to revive a judgment.
The judgment in the Circuit Court of the United States for the
Northern District of Illinois was no satisfaction of the judgment in
the county of Chautauque, in the State of New York. lrlufiford
vs. Stocker, 1 Cowen, 178. But satisfaction of the judgment in
New York would authorize the Circuit Court in Illinois either to
order a satisfaction of their judgment, or to order a stay of further
proceedings. If either order were made and certified here, there
could be no further proceedings in this Court. If the defendant
had paid the debt, interest, and costs of the judgment in New York,
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on proof of such payment, he would be entitled to have satisfaction
of the judgment in Illinois entered upon the payment of costs.
Upon the principle of the Constitution of the United States, and
acts of Congress, that full faith and credit shall be given in each
State to the judicial proceedings of every other State, an action on
the New York judgment could not be maintained against a plea of
discharge under the insolvent laws of that State. Judgments when
sued on in another State are to be considered of the same force and
validity as in the State wherein they were originally rendered.
The plaintiffs voluntarily subjected themselves to the jurisdiction
of the State of New York. Their judgment was subject to the judicial authority of that State; and they, in regard to their judgment
as an evidence debt, were bound by the subsequent action of the
courts of the State, whether they resided in the State or not. And
from the practice and proceedings of the courts of that State, after
the discharge of the defendant as an insolvent debtor, it was corn-.
petent to the Court of Chautauque county, upon motion, to order
that no further proceedings be had on the judgment. Whether that
order has been made or not does not appear, but we consider it as
made. The Supreme Court of Pennsylvania, in the Mferchants'
Insurance Company vs. De Wolf, 9 Casey, 45, decided that a
suit would lie on a record of a judgment in the State of New York
that had been appealed from, but not superseded; leaving the judgment to be set aside or stayed by audita querela or a writ of error
coram nobis, on a certificate of reversal of the original judgment.
The reversal of that judgment was uncertain, and the Court proceeded, until the fact of reversal should bd certified. In this case
the extinguishment of the original judgment as a debt of record is
reduced to a certainty.
Chief Justice Nelson, in the case of Jan Hook vs. Whitlach,
26 Wendall, 43, remarks, on page 54: "I am not aware that it has
been distinctly determined by any case in the Supreme Court of the
United States that the discharge would not have been a bar against
a citizen of another State, where the suit is brought in the Court of
the State in which it was granted, and upon a contract made therein
posterior to the law." Neither am I aware of any such decision in
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the Supreme Court of the United States. But we now see that the
Court of the State of New York has so decided ; and, as the plaintiffs would be barred of a suit in that State, this Court has no right
to question the position of the Court of that State, that the judgment in the county of Chautauque, into which the note merged, is
extinguished as evidence of a subsisting debt. I think the plaintiffs
are as much bound by the insolvent discharge of the defendant in
the State of New York, as if they had consented to the discharge,
and had received a dividend of the assets of the insolvent estate.
The judgment of the Circuit Court in Illinois was founded upon
and, as I have shown, is dependant upon the satisfaction or extinguishment of the judgment in New York. That judgment being
rendered before the insolvent discharge of the defendant, cannot be
interposed to deprive the defendant of the legal benefit of his discharge. Such being the legal consequence of that discharge, in
regard to the judgments in New York and Illinois, it follows that
the plaintiffs cannot maintain this suit, and that the demurrer must
be overruled, and judgment entered for the defendant.

_In the District Court of the United States for Maine.
tember, 1858.
THE JOHN L. DIMMICK.-SKOLFIELD

Sep-

CLAIMANT.

1. To entitle seamen to double wages, under the act of Congress, July, 1790, ch.
20th, sect. 9, on account of being put on short allowarce of provisions, both the
conditions mentioned in the act must concur, the vessel must have left her last
port with a less amount of provisions than is required by the act, and the crew
must have actually been put on short allowance during the voyage.
2. The statute is in its nature a penal law, and is not to be enlarged by construction
- beyond the natural and obvious meaning of its terms.
3. To bring a case within the statute, the short allowance must be during the passage of the vessel, and before she arrived at her port of destination.
4. When the crew is put on short allowance without necessity, in a case not within
the act of Congress, there is a wrong in breach of contract, and a remedy will be
given by a court of admiralty, in the form of additional wages.
5. It is a well-understood term of contract, that the crew, during the period of their
service, shall be furnished with provisions by the owners, sufficient in amount and
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of a suitable quality; and to refuse such a supply, without necessity, is as much a
breach of the contract as to refuse payment of their wages, though this obligation is not expressed in the written or printed contract.
6. When the ship was lying in the bay of Mobile four months, waiting for cargo,
and the usual supply of provisions from the ship's store were withheld, the crew
being required to furnish themselves, by taking oysters from the oyster-beds.
when the state of the weather permitted it to be done, and the supply being
insufficient in quantity, they were held to be entitled to two months' additional
wages.
7. The daily allowance to seamen, in the merchant service, ought to be equivalent to
the navy ration.
S. The general rule of the maritime law is that the ship is liable, in specie, for all
the obligations of the master, whether arising ex contractu or ex delicto, resulting
from acts done in the exercise and within the proper scope of his authority as
master.

aen. Fessenden and D. TV. Fessenden for the libellant.
Shepley &. Dana for the claimant.

The opinion of the Court was delivered by
WARE, District Judge.-This is a libel in rem., claiming extra
wages, on the ground of an alleged short allowance of provisions.
The libellant shipped on board of the John L. Dimmick, on the sixth
of November, 1857, for a voyage from Portland to Mobile, thence
to one or more ports in Europe, and thence back to her port of discharge in the United States, for wages at the rate of $ 18 per month.
The ship arrived at Mobile on the 28th of November, and lay there,
before proceeding to Havre, till the 7th of May, 1858, about six
months. The first week after her arrival, the crew were employed
in discharging her outward cargo, and in other work on the vessel;
and up to this time we have no complaint of the provisions. After
these services were performed, the ship remained lying at anchor in
the bay, about fifteen or twenty miles from the city, waiting for
freight, until the last days of March, or the first of April, a period
of about four months. They were then infoirmed that they would
not further have served to them their usual allowance of food from
the ship's stores, but they were to live on oysters ; and these were
to be procured, as it subsequently appeared, by themselves. It
seems that these shell-fish are found in great abundance in that bay,
and of a superior quality, and are taken with great facility. It is
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stated by some of the witnesses, that it is not unusual for vessels
lying there to be supplied with oysters, in part, at least, instead of
ordinary ship fare. From this time, for about four months, and till
they began to take in cargo, according to all the libellant's witnesses, their principal food was oysters, with the usual allowance of
bread, and a small quantity of flour and potatoes and turnips to
cook with them. The crew went themselves, in the ship's boats, to
the oyster banks to procure them, and brought them on board to
the amount of sixteen or twenty barrels at a time. From this time
to about the first of April, when they began to take in cargo, oysters
were the staple article of their food, and nearly, if not entirely, the
only article of animal food, except when the state of the weather
prevented them from obtaining a supply. Then they had the usual
ship fare of salted meat served out to them ; once, and only once,
.during the four months, their table was spread with fresh meat.
This was at Christmas. For at least two-thirds of the time, if not
more, their food, for morning, noon, and night, was oysters, boiled
with a little flour and potatoes or turnips. Three or four times during the four months they had beans, and about as many, rice. Twice
a week they had two small cakes baked for them, of soft bread, a
specimen of which was brought into court, and one of them allowed
for breakfast and one for dinner, instead of the allowance of ship
bread. Most men, unless of a very quiescent temper, would have
been dissatisfied with the sameness of this diet; but these men complained most of the insufficient quantity. They had not enough to
satisfy the cravings of nature, and some of the witnesses say that
not unfrequently they left the table as hungry as they went to it.
When, for want of oysters, salt meat was allowed, it was, according
to the testimony of the cook and the men, given with a sparing hand,
not much exceeding half a pound a day. Twice the men went aft
in a body, to complain to the captain. The first time they did not
see him, though he was in the cabin. The second time they carried
with them their breakfast of oysters, and asked him if he thought it
enough. He said no ; but if they did not open more, he would have
them called at four o'clock, instead of from five to six, the usual
hour of rising.
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What constitutes a full or short allowance in the merchant service,
is not fixed by the law. In the want of such a rule, the courts have
thought that it ought to be equivalent to the navy ration. That is
fixed at one pound of meat and fourteen ounces of hard bread, with
one quarter of an ounce of tea, or one ounce of coffee or cocoa, and
an addition of other faranaceous or vegetable food, as rice, peas or
beans, or dried fruit. It is a liberal allowance for a hearty, hardlaboring man. If the witnesses of the libellant are to be believed,
the allowance to this crew was far below the navy ration. The
case of a short allowance is then clearly made out, unless this'testimony is overcome by that offered by the claimant. Two witnesses
were examined on this point, the mate and the steward. They
appeared not unwilling to give a coloring to their testimony favorable to the owners. But when fairly examined, their testimony, I
think, leaves the case about where it stands on that for the libellant.
The credit of his witnesses is rather confirmed than impaired, and
it may be added that they gave their testimony with a degree of
coolness, deliberation, and apparent freedom from prejudice and
passion, unusual in such cases. It ought, also, not to be forgotten,
that during the whole of this four months of short allowance, there
was no insubordination; the crew were uniformly obedient and
submissive, with no appearance or pretence of even disrespectful
language or behavior on their part, except in a single instance
towards the mate, which is the subject of another suit now pending
in court.
There is one part of the mate's testimony that calls for attention, as it serves, if true, to explain and extenuate any complaint
of this exclusive diet on oysters. He says that before the crew were
put on this diet they were consulted by him, the whole crew being
present, and that they unanimously expressed a preference to have
oysters rather than fresh meat. In this I think the mate must be
mistaken, as all the other witnesses say, including the steward, that
they never heard anything of the kind until they heard it from the
mate in the court-room.
Upon these facts, the claimant has brought a libel claiming double
wages, under the act of Congress, of July, 1790, chap. 29, sec. 9,
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for the period of four months, while the crew were on short allowance. That act provides that every ship or vessel of 150 tons burthen, or more, bound on a voyage across the Atlantic, shall, on leaving
her last port, have on board, under deck, 60 gallons of water, 100
pounds of salted flesh meat, and 100 pounds of ship bread, for each
and every person on board, besides such other stores as may be
put on board by the master or any passengers, and in a like proportion for a longer or shorter voyage, and in default of this supply, if the crew are put on short allowance during the voyage, the seamen shall be paid double wages for the period of such short allowance.

This act appears to me to bear on its face the character of a penal
statute. It does not change the nature of the case that the penalty
is given to the seamen. It is, therefore, like other penal laws, to
receive a strict construction. The two facts of a deficient supply
and an actual short allowance are connected in the act by a copulative and not disjunctive word. Both must, therefore, concur to
constitute the quasi misdemeanor, which is visited with the penalty.
The Barque Child Harold, Olcott Rep. 278;. The Mary, Ware
Rep. 459. The first inquiry then is, Was there a deficient supply
on board when the ship sailed ? The last port from which she sailed,
before the short allowance, was Portland, and her port of destination, Mobile. Now, I think it is satisfactorily shown that the ship
on sailing had as large a supply of provisions as the law requires for
such a voyage. One of the facts, therefore, does not exist, which is
necessary to make up the delinquency. It is true, as argued by the
libellants' counsel, that if the provision is withheld from the crew, it
is to them, for whose benefit the law was made, the same grievance
as if the provisions were not there. Still, in the construction of a
penal statute, where the law makes two acts necessary to complete
the fault, it is a bold step for a court to say that it shall be completed by one.
But, if this were done, there is another difficulty behind, which
appears to me to be not easily overcome. The short allowance, to
bring the case within the statute, must be duringthe voyage. Now,
when was the voyage ended? Within the meaning of this act of
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Congress, it was, I think, on her arrival at Mobile. A voyage, in
the most common and familiar acceptation of the word, is the transit
from one place or port to another, and I think that the meaning
intended by the law-makers of this law. The object of the Legislature in requiring a given amount of provision, proportionate to
the ordinary duration of the passage, was to prevent that terrible
calamity, a famine at sea. This is, at least, one of the most common meanings of the word, and is, I think, its meaning in this statute. The short allowance did not commence until one week after
the arrival at Mobile, and not until the discharge of her outward
cargo. My opinion, therefore is, that this libel cannot be maintained for the statute penalty. But does it follow that the seaman
is without remedy for a great wrong ? I think not.
This statute penalty does not, and was not intended to affect the
mutual rights and obligations of the parties resulting from the
nature of the contract. What are these within its fair meaning ?
The seaman engages to render faithfully all the services that pertain
to the navigation of the ship, and all those that are naturally or by
custom incident to that duty, as the making some slight reparations
of the ship in caulking or painting the deck or other part of the
vessel, which is occasionally required, and, also, in the loading and
unloading the cargo, according to the custom of the trade in which
she is engaged. But it has never, to my knowledge, been considered an incident to their general duty as mariners to occupy their
time, while lying in port, in procuring provisions for the ship's use,
either by fishing or otherwise. On the other hand the seamen stipulate for and the owners promise to pay the agreed wages. This
stipulation and promise is embodied in the written contract. But
there is always implied another stipulation and promise, though not
put in writing, that provisions for the board of the crew shall be
furnished by the master and owners, and that these shall be served
out to them in sufficient amount and of suitable quality. This proviso is just as binding on the owners as the written promise to pay
their wages. To withhold from them an adequate supply, or to
furnish food that is unwholesome, or of an unsuitable quality, is just
as much a fraud in the contract, as it would be to pay them their
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wages in clipped coin or depreciated bank bills. I am unable to see
the ground on which a distinction can be made between one and
the other. If it be a manifest wrong and fraud on the contract, it
would be a reproach to the law not to furnish a remedy. What
difficulties might present themselves in the refined and subtle technicalities of the common law it is unnecessary here to inquire.
The wrong is not beyond the remedies of a court, professing, like
the admiralty, to decide, ex cequo et bono, on enlarged principles of
natural equity and the universal justice.
The seamen's contract so obviously includes board that it may be
deemed unnecessary to refer to authorities in support of this. But
the old sea laws were curiously directory on this as well as on other
subjects. The (Gonselatodel Maro, chap. 1.45, obliges the master to
give the seamen meat three times a week, that is, Sunday, Tuesday,
and Thursday, and wine every morning and afternoon, and to double
their rations on festival days. And if during the voyage he is in
want of provisions or other necessaries, and if he is without money,
the ship is bound; chap. 239. And it sbems that they were purchased on the credit of the ship solely, for if that was lost the creditor
lost his debt.
But this is a libel in rem against the vessel, and it is argued
that even admitting there is a wrong for which the seamen is entitled to a remedy, that it is one for which neither the owners nor the
ship is liable; that when the owners have put on board the vessel
provisions to the amount and of the quality required, if the master
unnecessarily puts the men on short allowance, this is his own personal delinquency, for which he alone is responsible. The general
rule is that the owners are responsible for the acts of the master
done in his character of master, and within the scope of his authority
as such. Omnia facta magistridebet prestare qui eum prcwposuit;
Dig. 14, , 1, § 5; eJus rei nomine cujus ibi prcepositus fuerit
Dig. 14, _, § 7. This is the language of the Roman law, and
the word facta, acts, include both the contract and faults or torts
of the master committed in the transaction and management of the
business within the legitimate range of his authority. For though
faults, like crimes, are in their nature personal, and imputable only
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to the delinquent individual, yet, says the jurisconsult, the exercitor
of a ship and the institor of a shop or store is considered as in some
measure culpable for employing an unsuitable man for his business.
Aliquatenus culpae reus est, quod opera malorum hominum uteretur, ideo quasi ex maleficio teneri videtur, Dig. 44, 17T1 5, § 6;
Instit. IV. 5, § 3. The law of France precisely agrees with the Roman law. The 216 article of the Code de Commerce provides that
the owners are civilly responsible for the acts of the captain in what
relates to the ship or the voyage. Tout proprietaireest civilement
responsible des faits du capitaine pour ce qui est relatif aus
navire et a 1'expedition. And the commentators explain the word
faits-acts-as a generic term, which includes des fautes et des engagemens, faults and contracts. .Emerlqon Oontrats d la Crosse,
chap. 4, sec. 2, by Boulay Paty. And this is in perfect conformity
with the ancient and well-established maritime law of Europe. The
Clonsolato del Mare, chap. 77, provides, that the captain shall be
liable for any damage done to merchandise by bad storage, and adds,
that "in all damages mentioned above, and in all those which shall
be mentioned in the chapters of the sea, which the ship ought to
pay, the captain is bound for his part, and each part owner for his
part. The ship is liable, but has its remedy over against the person
who is guilty of the fault.
The law of this country, as to the liability of owners for the acts
of the master, as I understand it, is the same as the general maritime law of the world. And it stands on the general principles of
the law of agency. The principal is always responsible to third
persons for the acts of his agent, for his faults, his acts of misfaisance or nonfaisance, committed in the transactions of the business
confided to him, as well as for his own contracts. Story on Agency,
sec. 452.
It is, without question, entirely within the scope of the master's
authority to direct and regulate the allowance of provisions for the
crew. In doing this, he acts strictly within the limits of his powers.
If he puts the crew on short allowance during the voyage, and the
vessel was not, when she sailed, provided with the required amount
of provisions, the act of Congress determines the nature and the ex-
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tent of the indemnity to the crew. They shall be allowed and paid
doub'e wages, and the penalty may be recovered with the stipulated
wages. The seamen have the same remedies for both against the
masters, owners, and the ship. If he puts them on short allowance
in a case that does not fall within the statute, as when the vessel
has been supplied with the amount of provisions required, or when
the vessel is not at sea on the voyage, but lying in port, or if he
provides for them food of an unwholesame or unsuitable quality, and
that without necessity, it seems to me to be not only an injury to
the crew in the nature of a tort or nonfeasance, as it appears to have
struck Judge Betts in the case of The Barque Ohild Hfarold,
Olcott Rep. 278, but, also, a plain breach of the well-understood
terms of the contract by the authorized agent of the owners, for
uhieh they are answerable on the ordinary principle of the law of
agency. And as this was an economy practiced by the captain for
the benefit of the ship and owners, and at the expense of the crew,
it is most equitable that the ship's owners should pay for it. The
crew had not only cause to complain of the insufficiency of their
allowance, but for being restricted almost exclusively to a single
article of animal food, and for part of the time, one or two weeks
after the oysters had, from the heat of the weather, become unwholesome, and absolutely unfit for food at all.
I allow, under the circumstances of the case, to the libellant, two
months additional wages, one-half the time the crew were on short
allowance.
Decree $36 damages and costs.
In the

ircuit Court of the United Statesfor the -EasternDistrict
of Pennsylvania.'
UNITED STATES vs. JAMES W.

HALL.

1. If a passenger in a railroad car or steamboat, passing over a post-road, carry
letters, without the knowledge or consent of the proprietor of such car or boat,
or any of his servants, the owner does not incur the penalty prescribed by the
nineteenth section of the act of Congress of the 3d of March, 1825.

1 From the Public Ledger of 9th October, 1844. This is the case cited by Cadwalader, J., in United States vs. Kechersperger, ante 150.
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2. If the owner of the car or steamboat be not liable under the nineteenth section
of the act, no penalty is incurred by the person who sends such letters, under
the twenty-fourth section.
3. But if a person be openly engaged in the business of private letter carrying over
the post-roads of the United States, and a railroad company be notified by public
advertisement, and by the agent of the post-office department, that the party and
his agents are engaged in such business, they will be liable to the penalty prescribed by the nineteenth section, for conveying such agents carrying letters.
4. And the company being liable under this section, the person employing such
agents in the transportation of letters over a post-road, becomes liable under the
twenty-fourth section.

This was an action to recover a number of penalties for a violation
of the twenty-fourth section of the act of Congress of the 3d of March,
1825. There was a special verdict, by agreement of the parties,
which is fully stated in the opinion of the Court; and, on a motion
to enter judgment upon the verdict in favor of the United States,
the following opinion was delivered by
RANDALL, J.-This action is brought to recover the sum of
two thousand dollars, alleged by the United States to have been
forfeited by the defendant, for various breaches of the provisions of
the act entitled "An act to reduce into one the several acts establishing and regulating the post-office department," approved March
3d, 1825, the nineteenth section of which enacts, "that no stage or
other vehicle, which regularly performs trips on a post-road or on
a road parallel to it, shall convey letters, nor shall any packetboat or other vessel which regularly plies on a water declared to be
a post-road, except such as relate to some part of the cargo: for
the violation of this provision, the owner of the carriage or other
vehicle or vessel shall incur the penalty of fifty dollars; and the
person who has the charge of such carriage or vehicle, or vessel,
may be prosecuted under this section, and the property in his
charge may be levied on and sold in satisfaction of the penalty and
costs of suit: Provided, That it shall be lawful for any one to send
letters by special messenger." And by the twenty-fourth section, it
is declared, "that every person who, from and after the passage of
this act, shall procure and advise and assist in the doing or perpetration of any of the acts or crimes by this act forbidden, shall be
subject to the same penalties and punishment as the persons are
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subject to, who actually do or perpetrate any of the said acts or
crimes, according to the provisions of this act." When the cause
came on for trial, the parties agreed that the jury should find the
following facts in the nature of a special verdict, viz:
"That the above-named defendant did, on the 5th day of July
last, enter upon the business of conveying letters out of the mails
of the United States of America, between the cities of Philadelphia
and New York, for all persons who would pay him at the rate of
six and a quarter cents for each single letter; and in pursuance
thereof, did establish offices in the said cities of Philadelphia and
New York, (as will appear by the printed advertisements annexed,)
and that the said defendant has ever since, daily, for forty successive days, been employed by himself and his agents in conveying
letters for hire out of the mails of the United States, in certain
steamboats and railroad cars, between the said cities of Philadelphia
and New York, and of delivering the same to the person or persons
to whom said letters were directed, and that the letters aforesaid
did not relate to any part of the cargo.
"That the steamboats and railroad cars aforesaid were owned
by the Camden and Amboy Railroad and Transportation Company,
and that the said steamboats plied regularly on a water, and the
said railroad cars performed regular trips on a road, which said
-water and road were declared by acts of Congress to be a postroad of the said United States. The said defendant was not a
member of said Company, nor did he own all or any part of said
steamboats and railroad cars.
"While engaged in the conveyance of letters, as aforesaid, the
said defendant and his agents paid the said Camden and Amboy
Railroad and Transportation Company the usual fare paid by
passengers over the road, for conveying him and them between the
said cities of Philadelphia and New York.
"The said Camden and Amboy Railroad Company were not
engaged in the business, and did not participate in the profits of
conveying the letters aforesaid; but were notified by public advertisements of the said defendant, and by the agents of the postoffice department of the United States, that the said defendant and
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his agents were employed in the said business of conveying letters
as aforesaid.
"And the jurors aforesaid do further find, that, at the time afQresaid, there was a contract under date of the - day of
between the Postmaster-General of the United States and the
said Camden and Amboy Railroad and Transportation Company, for the transportation of the mails of the United States
between the said cities of Philadelphia and New York, in the
same steamboats and railroad cars which conveyed the letters
of the defendant, as aforesaid. And the said jurors do further find
and present, as part of their special verdict, certain acts of the
Legislatures of Pennsylvania and New Jersey, relating to the said
Camden and Amboy Railroad and Transportation Company,
together with the charter of the same."
The District Attorney moved for judgment in favor of the United
States on this verdict, which the counsel for the defendant resist
and contend-first, that if the act of 1825 is so construed, as to
give to Congress the exclusive power to establish and regulate postroads, then it is unconstitutional and void; and if not so construed,
then the defendant has committed no offence.
The eight section of the first article of the Constitution of the
United States declares, among other things, that Congress shall
have power to establish post-offices and post-roads, "and to make
all laws which shall be necessary and proper for carrying into
execution the foregoing powers." Without undertaking now to
examine the cases in which the last branch of this section has
received a construction in the courts of the United States, and
admitting that the phraseology of the act of 1825 is to be construed,
as contended for by the counsel of the United States, I do not feel
such a "clear and strong incompatability" between the Constitution and the act of Congress so construed as will authorize me to
declare the act void. -letcher vs. Peck, 6 Cranch, 87. It is not
upon slight implication and vague conjecture that the Legislature
is to be pronounced to have transcended its power; the presumption is always in favor of the validity of the law, if the contrary is
not clearly demonstrated, 4 Dallas, 14. It will, therefore, be
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necessary to consider the second ground of the defence, viz: that
admitting the law to be constitutional, the facts found by the jury
do not render the defendant liable to any of its penalties.
It is contended by the defendant, that this, being a penal law, is
to be strictly construed, and that, unless the owners of the cars
knew that the defendant was carrying letters in violation of the
law, they were not liable to the penalty provided by the nineteenth
section, and that if the owners were not liable under that section,
then the defendant cannot be liable under the twenty-fourth. And
the United States vs. Kimball, decided by the District Court of
the United States for the District of Massachusetts, (7 Law Rep.
32,) and subsequently affirmed by Judge Story, in the Circuit
Court of the First Circuit, has been relied on as sustaining their
positions.
In the case of the United States vs. Fisher, tried before me in
June last, the same case was relied on by the counsel for the
defence, and a newspaper report of the affirmation of the judgment
of the District Court was produced. In charging the jury, I
expressed myself as not satisfied with the reasons given by the
District Judge for the conclusion at which he had arrived, and
expressed a doubt as to the correctness of the newspaper report of
the decision of the Circuit Court; at the same time, I mentioned
to the jury, that if the counsel for the defendant could afterwards
show me that the distinguished Judge, presiding in the Circuit
Court, had expressed a judicial opinion on the subject, I would
cheerfully yield my opinion to his. The letter of Judge Story to
the Postmaster-General of September 4th, 1844, shows that he
adopted the opinion of Judge Sprague. The facts, as given in
evidence in the case of Fisher, are similar, and within the principle
decided in the case of Kimball. The same view of the law has
since been taken by the learned Judge of the Northern District of
New York, (Judge Conkling,) in the case of the United States vs:
Pomeroy & Co. I, therefore, cheerfully yield my opinion to such
authority, and will make the rule to show cause why a new trial
should not be granted in Fisher's case absolute.
It remains to be considered how far the questions decided in the
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case of Kimball are similar to those in the present. Judge Story,
in his letter to the Postmaster-General, says, "I coincide in the
opinion of Judge Sprague, and my own opinion was confined to the
very question decided by him."
The questions decided by Judge Sprague, are:
1. That if a passenger in a railroad car or steamboat, passing
over a post-road or route, carry a letter without the knowledge
or consent of the owner of the car or steamboat, or any of his agents
or servants, such owner is not liable to the penalty provided by the
nineteenth section of the act of 1825.
2. That such knowledge or assent are not to be presumed from
the facts admitted in the case: and,
8. That the person who sends such letter by such passenger is
not liable to the penalty provided by the twenty-fourth section of
said act, unless the owner of the car or steamboat is liable to the
penalty provided by the nineteenth section.
The facts in that case, as reported in the opinion of Judge
Sprague, were, that the defendant sent a letter from Boston to
New York, by a person who went as a passenger in the car, and
who received no compensation for carrying the letter; but the
defendant had received compensation therefor, and his stamp, indicating the fact, was upon the letter. The person who carried the
letter had no connection with the owners of the car or their agents,
except as a passenger. The owners had previously advertised
that they would not take passengers who would convey letters contrary to law, and enjoined all persons in their employment not to
receive them; neither the owner nor their agents had any knowledge of the conveyance of said letters.
The facts found by the jury, in the present case, differ in many
particulars from that. Instead of sending a single letter by a
passenger, the defendant entered upon the business of conveying
letters out of the mail, established offices for that purpose, and in
pursuance of what, in his advertisements, he calls his "Independent Mail Arrangements," was, by himself and his agents, employed
"1for forty successive days" in carrying letters out of the mails of
the United States.
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That this was contrary to the spirit of the act of 1825, can
hardly be contended. But it is said, that act being highly penal
is to be strictly construed, and unless the defendant is also within
the letter of the law, he may defy its spirit with impunity.
But notwithstanding this rule, the intention of the law-makers
:must govern in the construction of penal as well as other statutes;
they are not to be construed so strictly as to defeat the obvious
intention of the Legislature; the maxim is not to be applied so as
to narrow the words of the statute to the exclusion of cases which
those. words, in their ordinary acceptation, or in the sense in
which the Legislature has obviously used them, would comprehend.
The intention of the Legislature is to be collected from the words
they employ. Where there is no ambiguity in words, there is no
room for construction. United States vs. Wiltberger, 5 Wheat. 76.
Nothing more is meant by the maxim that penal laws shall
receive a strict construction, than that they shall not, by what
may be thought their spirit or equity, be extended to offences,
other than those which are specially described and provided for.
A court is not, therefore, precluded from inquiring into the intention of the Legislature. However clearly a law may be expressed,
this must ever, more or less, be a matter of inquiry. A court is
not, however, permitted to arrive at this intention by mere conjecture, but is to collect it from the object which the Legislature had
in view, and the expressions used, and which should be competent
and proper to apprise the community at large of the rule, which it
is intended to prescribe for the Government. 1 Paine, 334.
That the intention of the Legislature in passing the act of 1825,
was to prevent competition with the Government on any of the
mail routes, cannot be denied; some of the routes are profitable,
and produce a revenue to the post-office department; but others
are a burden, and exhaust this profit in their support. If the most
profitable routes are to be occupied by private individuals or companies, the consequence must be, that the remote routes, although
of equal importance to those interested in them, must be abandoned,
or supported from the treasury of the United States; which is well
known to be contrary to the general policy of the Government.
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But, whatever be the consequence of such a construction, unless
the offence of the defendant is within the obvious prohibition of the
Legislature, he is not liable to the penalty.
The prohibition iii the nineteenth section is against "any stage
or other vehicle" carrying letters on a post-road ; for the violation
of this provision, the owner of the vehicle is made liable to a
penalty of fifty dollars, which may be recovered in an action
against the person having charge of the vehicle, who is not made
personally liable; but a judgment against him authorizes a levy
on and sale of the vehicle, although not belonging to him. It is
said, however, that this judgment cannot be obtained, or the
penalty enforced, unless the consent of the owner to the transmission of the letters was first obtained. That the prohibition implies
an act, or that the vehicle is but an instrument, and being but an
inanimate object, can give no consent nor commit no offence ; yet,
by the act, it is the vehicle or carriage,and not the owner, that is
prohibited.
In the case of the United States vs. The Schooner Little Oharles,
1 Brockenbrough, 848, the schooner was seized for a violation of
the embargo laws, and the libel dismissed by the District Court.
An appeal was entered to the Circuit Court, in delivering the
opinion of which, Ch. J. Marshall observes: "This is not a proceeding against the owner; it is a proceeding against the vessel for an
offence committed by the vessel, which is not less an offence, and
does not less subject her to forfeiture, because it was committed
without the authority and against the will of the owner. It is
true, that inanimate matter can commit no offence. The mere
wood, iron, and sails of the ship cannot of themselves violate the
law. But this body is animated and put in action by the crew,
who are guided by the master, &c.;" and the vessel was condemned
and forfeited. See also 12 Wheaton, 14, 15.
It is further argued, that the owners of the cars were but common
carriers, bound to take the passengers without the privilege of
examining or detaining their baggage, that there was perfect innocence of intention on their part, and the infliction of a penalty, under
such circumstances, would not be consonant to the general principles of jurisprudence or natural equity.
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: There are, however, many cases under the revenue laws, in
which a party, with perfect innocence of intention, and without any
idea that he is violating the law, becomes liable or subject to a
penalty or forfeiture. This is clearly manifesfed by the act of 3d
of March, 1797, which provides a mode for the remission of the
fine or forfeiture, where it has been incurred, "without willful
negligence or any intention of fraud, in the person or persons
incurring the same." 1 Story, 458.
The nineteenth section of the act, which inflicts this penalty,
says nothing about the guilt or innocence of the owners; it says
that no stage or other vehicle shall convey letters ; and for the
violation of this, the owner is made liable for a penalty. In the
case of the United States vs. The Brig Malek Adhel, 2 Howard,
210, which was an appeal from the Circuit Court for the District
of Maryland, affirming the judgment of the District Court, which
condemned the brig for certain alleged piratical acts, it was admitted that the owners never contemplated or authorized said acts, and
the equipments of the vessel, when she left New York, and ever afterwards, were the usual equipments of a vessel of her class, on an
innocent commercial voyage, such as that stated in the evidence.
In delivering the opinion of the Court, Judge Story observes,
(page 233,) "1The next question is, whether the innocence of the
owners can withdraw the ship from the penalty of confiscation,
under the act of Congress. Here again, it may be remarked, that
the act makes no exception whatsoever, whether the aggression be
with or without the co-operation of the owners; the vessel which
commits the aggression is treated as the offender, as the guilty
instrument or thing to which the forfeiture attaches, without any
reference whatsoever to the character or conduct of the owner ;
and this is done from the necessity of the case, as the only
adequate means of suppressing the wrong."
The same necessity, it appears to me, exists in the present case.
Any other construction of the act would, in my opinion, go wholly
to defeat its operation and violate its plain import. But the jury
have here found that the railroad company were notified by public
advertisements, and by the agents of the post-office department of
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the United States, that the defeindant and his agents were
employed in the business of carrying letters. Such notice, certainly, would go far to remove any objection to making them liable
to the penalty to which, in the cases cited, the owners were subjected, withoutnotice or opportunity to avoid the prohibited act.
It is my opinion, from the facts found by the jury, that the
defendant did procure and assistin the doing or perpetration of the
acts prohibited by the nineteenth section of the act of 1825, and
that by so doing has incurred the penalties claimed by the United
States. I feel the less difficulty in coming to this conclusion, as the
case has been submitted with a view (whatever may be the result
here) of removing it for reconsideration to the Supreme Court of
the United States, whose decision will hereafter insure a uniform
course in all the courts of the Union, and where any error or injustice
has been committed by this court it will be fully corrected.
Judgment is entered on the verdict in favor of the United States,
for $2,000.
George M. Dallas and Henry X. Watts for the United Sates.
-JohnSergeant and 0. _F. Johnson for the defendant.

In the Supreme Judicial Court of Hassacusetts.
ATLANTIC BANK VS. MERCHA-NTS BANK.

1. A, a broker, drew a check on the Merchants Bank, wheme he had LO funds, and
by fraudulently conspiring with B, the Bank's paying teller, caused the check to
be marked "good ;" and thereupon A, the broker, took it to C, a teller in the Atlantic Bank, who cashed it, and the funds were then. placed in the hands of B, in
order to make B's account good while undergoing an examination by.the Bank's.
officers: the purpose for which the money wasto be used being known to all three
of the parties, but unknown to the officers of either Bank,. and it being intended
to be returned the next day after the examination; but before the check was returned and a settlement made between the-Banks, B:s-fraud was discoveced, and,
he committed suicide: it was held, that the Atlantic-Bank, whose money was taken
without authority and without consideration, and by a fraud, and went direotly into
the funds of the Merchant's Bank by a conspiracy of the tellers, could maintain
an action of assumpsit for money had and received.
2. The transfer of a sum of money from one party to another, in order to be a payment of a debt, must be so intended by both parties.
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In this case, which was argued at November Term, 1857, and
decided at March Term, 1858, the facts appear in the opinion of a
majority of the Court, as drawn up by
SHAW, C. J.-The amount in controversy in the present case is
sufficient to give it a character of importance, and the principles on
which it is to be decided require careful consideration. It is an action brought by one regular incorporated city bank against another,
to recover the sum of $50,000, which, it is alleged by the plaintiffs,
has been fraudulently transferred from their own possession to that
of the defendants, and the latter has no right in equity and good
conscience t9 hold it against the plaintiffs. The action was commenced on the 3d of May, 1855, being indebitatus assumpsit, for
the above-named sum and interest thereon. The answer denies that
the defendants owe the amount, as alleged.
The case came on to be tried. At the close of the plaintiffs' evidence it was suggested by the Court, and assented to by both parties, that the whole evidence should be reported, and that the Court
-drawing such inferences of fact as a jury would be warranted in
drawing-should enter such judgment as the law requires, or order
a new trial, if in the opinion of the Court such trial would be necessary to a more perfect understanding of the rights of the parties.
There is no great conflict of evidence now on any material point,
and the case upon the evidence is substantially this:
Thomas W. Hooper, who was the paying teller of the Merchants
Bank, was a defaulter to a large amount. He was the principal
teller, and had the iminediate charge and custody of the cash funds
within the bank; and other officers, who were necessarily entrusted
with cash, accounted with him daily. In theory, therefore, he had,
and at all times ought to have, in his control cash-i. e. always, be
it understood, specie or bank notes-to the amount which he would
appear to be charged with, by the balance of the book-keeper's account. That balance, perhaps, could not be struck till the close of
each day's business, because during business-hours each day the balance might be constantly shifting by the passing transactions.
It was the practice of the Directors to examine and count the teller's cash occasionally-ordinarily, as often as once a quarter. The
purpose of this examination and count was to ascertain whether any
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cash had been withdrawn: the teller having no occasion and no authority to pay or receive money outside of the bank; if there was a
deficiency, it must be attributed to fraud or mistake, and it would
afford one means of detecting either. On Monday, 26th of March,
shortly before the close of bank hours, the President gave notice to
looper, the teller, that he and a Committee of the Directors would
attend that afternoon, to examine and count his cash. The object
of giving this notice was, that he might be there with his keys, ready
to produce the cash as called for. Short as the time was, it gave
looper an opportunity to carry into effect a fraudulent scheme, by
which he was to obtain a sum of money to place with his own whilst
being counted, and thus fraudulently to conceal from the Directors
a knowledge of his defalcation. A conspiracy had been deliberately
entered into between Hooper, the defaulting teller of the Merchants
Bank, Richard Ward, a teller of the Atlantic Bank, and Augustus
S. Peabody, a broker, to this effect: that Peabody should draw a
check on the Merchants Bank, where he had no funds, for $25,000;
that Hooper should certify it to be "good;" that thereupon Peabody should take it to Ward, at the Atlantic Bank, receive $25,000
of the bills of the Atlantic or other cash funds, take them back and
deliver them to Hooper, to be placed with his own cash funds, and
be counted with them as his own: after they had been so used, Hooper
was to deliver back the like amount, $25,000, to Peabody, to be de.
livered to Ward, and replaced with the funds of the Atlantic. In
confirmation of this conspiracy, and that it was deliberate, the same
thing had been actually practised on Thursday of the previous week,
when Hooper had notice that his cash was to be counted ; but the
notice, for some reason, was not acted on, and the cash was not
counted: the $25,000 taken from the Atlantic, in the manner before stated, was restored to it by Ward, its teller. The same thing
was again done on the 26th of March, near the close of bank hours,
after the notice t6 Hooper that his cash was then to be examined.
Peabody drew the check, Hooper certified it "good;" Peabody carried it to Ward, of the Atlantic, and received from him $16,000 in
bills of the Atlantic and $9,000 in bills of other banks, carried them
to Hooper, passed them to him over the counter of the Merchants
Bank, and tirey were placed by Hooper with the funds of that bank
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of which he was the ordinary keeper, within the bank. Peabody
and Ward both knew of the purpose for which Hooper wanted the
money; and it was the understanding between all of them that the
money was, the next morning, to be returned to Ward, and replaced
-with the funds of the Atlantic Bank, as had been done the week before when taken for a similar purpose. The delivering of the money
from Ward to Peabody was without authority or knowledge of any
other officer of the Atlantic.
Pursuant to the notice given by the President of the Merchants
Bank to Hopper, the cash of that bank was counted on the afternoon
of 26th of March by Haven, President, and Fay, one of the Directors. The above $25,000 was included, and counted with the teller's cash. The amount was found to be coirect, and a ceftificate
to that effect was made and entered in the minutes of the Directors.
After it was thus counted, the whole amount was returned to Hooper,
who put it into his trunks, locked them, and returned them to their
several places in the bank.
During this examination the susricions of the President were
somewhat excited, by finding, as he thought, an unusual amount of
the bills of the Grocers Bank and by finding two large packages of
Atlantic bills, and he questioned Hooper about it; but he had no
suspicion, at that time, of Hooper's honesty.
During the same afternoon, one of the Directors, Fay, stated to
the President, that it was known outside the bank that the cash
was to be counted that afternoon, and Hooper also was asked if he
had said anything about counting the money; and he said he had not.
After Hooper had received back his cash and left, some conversation took place between Fay and the President, in which they
expressed their confidence in the honesty of Hooper, but their surprise at the singular circumstance that it should be known out of
the bank that the cash was to be then counted; and a proposal was
then made and assented to, to have another examination as soon as
convenient-suddenly; that is, without previous notice to the teller.
In consequence of these feelings, the President determined to
speak with Hooper the next morning. He went to the bank earlier than usual, a little before the. ordinary bank-hour for opening.
Hooper was then just entering the bank. The President wished to
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speak with him, and they went into the Directors' room, when a
conversation followed, which is thus stated in the President's testimony:-" I said, 'Mr. Hooper, I asked you, yesterday, if you had
told any one that the money was to be then counted;' and he said,
No, I told you I had not.' I said, 'Such a communication as that
disturbed me a little, and I felt that I would speak to you and ascertain if you had named it to any one.' I asked why it should have
been alluded to outside of the bank. I told him I put great confidence inhim, and should be satisfied with his answer, and wished, if
there was any trouble in his private affairs, he would divulge it to me.
He said, emphatically: 'The cash is right; you have examined
it, and know that it is right; and I have nothing to divulge.'"
Some other conversation took place. Hooper thanked him for
the confidence the Directors placed in him, and expressed a wish to
go immediately to New York, where he had been intending soon to
make a visit. Haven discouraged his going there, but told him, if
he saw fit to go, to go and deliver his money to Simpson, the receiving-teller; not expecting, however, that he was to leave before
the close c-f business that day. Haven did not displace him, and
entertained no suspicion of his integrity. He did not understand
that Hooper proposed to leave the bank to go to New York, till the
close of that day. Haven did not go into the banking-room till half
an hour after, and then saw the cashier in Hooper's place. After
the counting, the President and Committee would not have handed
back the cash to Hooper, if there had been a deficit: it was handed
back to him and left in his entire control, inthe usual way, without
any one to watch him.
It appears that Hooper did not take his place in the bank-room
that morning; and, before half-past 10 A. M., had committed suicide.
It further appears, that on the 27th, after the death of Hooper,
by suicide, had become known, Peabody and, afterward, Ward went
into the Merchants Bank, and fully disclosed to Haven and other
Directors the facts and circumstances under which the said check
for $25,000 had been drawn by Peabody, and certified "good" by
Hooper. Haven said to him, that Hooper had no right to certify
such check, and the bank would not pay it.
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In the morning of that day, according to the usual practice of
Boston banks, Ward, the teller of the Atlantic, received from the
Merchants Bank, by the messenger, thJ $16,000 of their own bills,
and the $9,000 of other banks, and Ward, in his official capacity,
gave the Merchants Bank credit for that amount, together with some
few other bills. This was before the death of Hooper. The check
was not then sent. But, subsequently, the check was sent with
other funds, after the death of Hooper was known; but, before 12
o'clock, the other funds -were received by the Merchants' and credited, but the check was refused payment, and subsequently, the
same day, protested by a Notary Public for non-payment.
Perhaps it may not be necessary to state the facts more particularly; some others may be referred to hereafter.
In the first place, it is obvious that this sum of $25,000 in cashbank notes, used and treated for most purposes as cash, in the same
manner with specie-was transferred from the plaintiff bank to the
defendant bank by means of a gross fraud and conspiracy, deliberately formed, carried into effect by three persons, with steady
purpose and performance, attended with as much criminality and
turpitude as can well characterize any transaction, where rights of
property only are violated. Hooper, the paying teller, entrusted
with the actual custody of the whole cash of the Merchants Bank,
was under an old defalcation, which he designed fraudulently to
conceal. Peabody, a broker, and Ward, a confidential officer of the
Atlantic Bank, entered into a fraudulent conspiracy with Hooper,
with a full knowledge of his criminal purpose, to enable him to conceal this defalcation from his employers-first, by abstracting the
funds of the Atlantic by an embezzlement amounting to larceny, and,
subsequently, to defraud the Merchants, by a similar embezzlement
to be practiced by Hooper. It is immaterial to any question here,
who of these parties was first to propose the scheme, or what motive
personally actuated them respectively; they each knew of the criminal purpose, and each contributed in his own measure to accomplish
it. It was a criminal conspiracy to do an unlawful act by an unlawful means. The first act was that of Hooper, in endorsing
Peabody's check.
The next consideration is, that by means of this fraud the money
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was taken from the Atlantic without its authority, and for which
it received no consideration, and went directly into the cash funds
of the Merchants Bank, for which it paid no consideration, unless
it was to be deemed a lawful payment of Hooper's defalcation,
which we shall consider afterwards.
It was the property of the plaintiffs when it left their bank. The
guilty agents, including Hooper, with full knowledge of the fraud,
could acquire no title to it against the plaintiffs. Hooper could,
therefore, give no title to the bank, as of right; nor could the bank
hold the bills as negotiable securities, transferable by delivery, taken
for a good consideration and in the ordinary course of business, nor as
money, without some consideration paid. It appears, therefore, to
be the ordinary case, where one party has received money, the property of another, which rightfully, equitably, and in good conscience
he cannot hold, and therefore the action of assumpsit for money had
and received will lie for it.
It may be proper to consider whether money, had and received,
is the proper remedy, or whether the action should have been in
tort for the conversion of the bank bills. It appears that $16,000
of the $25,000 taken from the Atlantic Bank, were its own bills.
Had these been new bills, never issued by the bank, one scruple
might arise, whether the bank, without having delivered them,
would be bound as contractors. It is said that on this ground the
Bank of England never issue a bill the second time, but take it up
and cancel it. But here it is the universal custom of all banks to
issue the same bills toties quoties, so that when a bank bill, duly
executed, is abroad, in the hands of a bona fide holder, the Court
will presume that it has been issued by the bank, and will hold
them to pay it. Stealing or embezzling from a bank its own notes,
duly executed and kept as cash to be paid out, whenever the bank
has occasion to make payment, has the same injurious consequences
of defrauding the bank as the taking of the bills of other banks
held by it; and the impossibility of identifying such no-tes, when
out, as notes thus stolen, leads practically to the same result. Where
the question is, of an intent to defraud the bank itself, and also to
defraud other persons, stealing from a bank its own notes is to be
considgred an offence of the same character as that of stealing the
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notes of other banks. We do not perceive, therefore, that any distinction can be made between the $16,000 and the $9,000. And
the Court are of opinion that as the bills in question were used and
treated as money, and are now claimed to be held by the defendants
as their own cash, the case comes within the general rule, that
when bank bills are delivered as money and received as money, they
may be considered as money for the purpose of remedy, and that
averments of money had and received, money laid out and expended,
may be sustained by proving such payment in bank bills, in the
same manner as if paid in specie. Where money in bills was entrusted to a carrier, who lost it at play, it was held that the owner
might recover the amount of the winner, in an action for money had
and received.
Mason vs. Waite, 17 Mass. 560; Cummings vs.
Noyes, 10 Mass. 433; Whitwel vs. Vincent, 4 Pick. 449.
It is a well-settled maxim, that where chattels have been taken
without title, and converted so that the owner might maintain trover
if money had been received for them, he may waive the tort, and
maintain assumpsit for the money. It seems to follow, therefore,
that when the thing taken without title and converted, is itself an
article which is ordinarily regarded as money, this action will lie.
It is, therefore, we think, to be considered in the same light as if
by the same means they had obtained the money from the Atlantic
Bank and transferred it to the Merchants, in bags of current specie.
But, further, on a slight re-consideration of the evidence, it seems
to us that these views are rendered entirely unnecessary by the
fact that before either bank had notice of the fraud by which these
bills passed from the possession of the one to the other, the Merchants Bank, by its authorized officers, presented all the bills, as well
the $16,000 of Atlantic bills as the $9,000 of others, to the Atlantic,
and received payment for them. It follows, therefore, that whether
the defendant bank received these bills rightfully or wrongfully,
with or without valid title, they presented them to the plaintiff bank,
and received of them the full amount in cash, so that if defendants
are responsible in any form, it is strictly money had and r~ceived.
We have said that this money came into the possession and under
the control of the Merchants Bank without any consideration passing from them, unless, as it is argued on the part of the defendants,
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it was received in payment of a debt due them from Hooper. The
argument is this : that Hooper, being under a defalcation to a large
amount, which he had kept concealed, obtained the money from the
Atlantic Bank and placed it in the Merchants Bank, by way of payment of such balance, and that it is immaterial to the bank how he
acquired the money to pay them with, even if by fraud, if the bank
did not know or participate in it. But if the law were so, this
argument, in our opinion, cannot be sustained by the facts.
Whether the transfer of a sum of money, from one party to
another, operates as a payment of an existing debt or duty, depends
upon intention, and the intention of both parties. Such intention
may often be implied from their relations and other circumstances.
But it must exist. The bank could have no such intention, because
if there was any defalcation, it was not known to it, and any intent
to receive this money in payment of such defalcation is negatived.
There was no payment in fact, no delivery of money, actual or
constructive, from the hand or power of the one to that of the other.
Hooper, by clandestinely placing it with other funds of the bank in
his possession, for the purpose of deceiving the bank, did not part
with the control over it-it is still in his own power. Passing it to
the committee, for the special purpose of being counted as their own,
not as his, inducing them by fraud to believe that it was their own,
and thereby precluding them from any inference or suspicion that
it was his, was no act of transfer from Hooper, and could be accompanied by no intent to receive it as payment. Hooper's presenting
that sum of money to the committee for that purpose was a significant declaration, on his part, that it was all money, which, as their
officer and agent, he had received as their due in the regular course
of their business; and although this was a gross falsehood, it shows
the state of mind in which their officers received and examined his
money and returned it, and precludes the idea that they received it
in payment.
But in truth it was not the intention of Hooper to transfer the
money to the bank for their own use, in satisfaction and discharge
of the sum due them in consequence of his prior defalcations. It
was intended to deceive them by exhibiting these bills, of which he
himself was the keeper, and it was with the expectation and intent,
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as soon as that object was accomplished, to deliver them back.
Such a transaction could no more cancel and pay a debt than the
exhibition of the same amount in counterfeit bills. If it was a pay.ment, it discharged Hooper and his sureties from all liability for
such defalcation, which, as it seems to us, cannot be pretended.
Had this money been found in the custody of Hooper, on examining his cash after his death, and nothing had been shown as to the
mode in which it had been acquired, it might have been presumed
that it was received by Hooper, in his official capacity, for a valuable consideration, in the due and ordinary course of business, in
which case ft might well have been presumed to be the property of
the bank. Such possession, under such circumstances, might have
been a prima facie title. But here there is no room for these presumptions. The proof is, that it did not come into the possession
of Hooper in his official capacity, in the ordinary course of business,
but was procured and placed there by his fraud.
If the act of the President and Fay, in examination of the money,
is relied on as an admission on the part of the bank that Hooper
had accounted for all the cash entrusted to him, the answer is, that
certificate was obtained by fraud, and cannot affect the bank; and,
further, that that examination was made, alio intuitu, it was-not an
accounting, it was simply an examination, and the whole, when examined and certified, was redelivered to Hooper, and remained in his
custody till next day. In consequence of his suspicious conduct that
morning, and his almost immediate death by suicide, other officers of
the bank were put into the possession of the bills thus left by him.,
The argument is, that by the production of the money to the committee, as and for his balance, and by the certificate of the committee, the property and right to the money is vested in the bank.
But the answer is that it was not produced as and for his balance;
neither party had any such relation in view.
If the defalcation of Hooper, which was then not known to the
bank, but which is now known to have then existed, was not discharged by the production and exhibition to the committee of these
bills, then no consideration passed from the defendants to Hooper,
or any one else, as the price of those bills, and the defendants
acquired their possession of them without consideration.
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There is, however, another aspect in which the case may be considered, not essentially varying from the foregoing, but which may
bring into view another legal element, that of knowledge of the fraud.
Undoubtedly the law intends, for wise considerations, to give the
highest degree of credit to negotiable security, payable on time not
yet expired, taken for valuable consideration, in the usual course of
business, without notice of any antecedent fraud or want of title
which would vitiate them, the reasons for which are very strong and
quite satisfactory. Wheeler vs. Guild, 20 Pick. 545.
The credit given to bank bills in ordinary circulation is still
higher, and the actual possession will be accompanied by a presumption of good title. The presumption, perhaps, is not so strong
when bank notes are collected in large sums, and in the dealings of
banks in them. Still, the presumption in either case is one of fact,
and may be rebutted by evidence. And it will be rebutted in a
case wherein the owner of bank bills proves that certain bills owned
by him have been obtained from him by theft or fraud, and have
passed from the fraudulent possessor to the defendant with knowledge of the fraud, and if they have passed through the hands of
several persons, each having knowledge of such fraud, the holder,
with the full benefit of the presumption of fact, that he has a good
title, cannot hold it against one who can prove a prior good title,
not rightfully transferred to any one, though without such notice
he would have held it. For the application of this principle, actual
notice is not necessary; constructive notice is sufficient. In the
present case, there is not the slightest ground to suspect that the
president, or any officer or director of the defendant bank, had any
actual notice of the fraud by which Hooper obtained these bills
from the Atlantic Bank, or that be obtained them at all. They
had no knowledge of his defalcation till after his death, when they
obtained a knowledge of the facts from Peabody and Ward.
Had they constructive notice ? A bank is a corporation which
can only act by agents; all its transactions in buying or selling,
borrowing and lending, every act by which it can convey property
or acquire it, must be done by agents. When any one of these
transactions is of such a character that false representations, practice of fraud, or knowledge of fraud practised by another would
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avoid the transaction, if done by an individual, it will equally affect
a corporation, if done or,had by the agent, in the same transaction
for a corporation. Suppose a corporation have occasion to obtain
insurance, and the agent who negotiates it makes false representations, which would render the policy void, if made for himself, it
will render it void as a contract with the corporation, his principal.
They will be affected with constructive notice. So, if a bank should
have occasion to buy a horse for its messenger, and authorize him to
buy one, and the agent shiould find one to his liking, and in negotiating about the purchase, should be informed that another man claimed
that the horse had been obtained from him by fraudulent representations, it would be constructive notice of such claim to the bank.
In the present case, treating these notes obtained from the plaintiffs, in the most favorable view, either as bank bills, or negotiable
securities, not discredited, or as specific property, the Court are of
opinion that the only title accuired in them being through the
agency of Hooper, his knowledge of the fraudulent title, under
which he acquired and held them, was constructively the defendants'
knowledge, and they cannot hold them against the true owners.
Here the first step as an official act of Hooper, the paying officer
of the bank, was certifying that Peabody's check was good. It
has been held that a bank teller has no power to bind the bank by
such a certificate, even when the fact may be true when the check
is presented, so that if not then paid, and other checks come in
and the fund is paid out on them, the holder of such check has no
remedy against the bank. Htussey vs. Eagle Bank, 9 Met. 306.
But, in the present case, it was a formal assertion, under his official signature, to a stupendous falsehood. This was done to enable
his guilty associates to make use of what appeared to them perhaps
to be the credit of the bank. Possibly Ward believed that this
was a good security, by means of which he could realize the money
from the Merchants Bank, and replace that of which he was defrauding his employers. At all events, we cannot say that without
the intervention of this official act the fraudulent teller could have
obtained the money he did. It was solely through the agency of
Hooper that the defendants acquired any title to the bills, or any
possession of them. The whole transaction, his falsehood to the
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officers in sayihg that he told nobody that the money was to be
counted that day, after he had notice from the president, when the
evidence shows that this guilty machinery was all put in motion by
notice to his guilty associates,-all these circumstances show how
deeply conscious Hooper was of a guilty purpose. If notice to the
agent was constructive notice to the bank, then the bank took these
securities under an invalid title, which cannot prevail.
Some cases were cited to show that where an agent has become
indebted to his principal, and pays the balance in current money,
the principal can hold the money, although obtained by fraud. This
may well be conceded to be good law; when the money obtained
by fraud is not obtained by the exercise of such agency, the agent
makes no contract in behalf of his principals, and they take nothing
and claim nothing through his fraud.
It was claimed by the defendants that the plaintiffs had waived
their right to proceed against the defendants, and had affirmed the
doings of Ward in taking and claiming payment of the check. But
there is nothing in the evidence to warrant this conclusion. No
notice was had of the fraud until after the $2,000 in bills had been
sent from the Merchants Bank to the Atlantic Bank, and paid by
the latter.' That is, they were received and credited to the Merchants Bank, but according to custom no settlement was made.
Before 12 o'clock, but after Hooper's death, Ward made out
another list, including the $25,000 check, with a few thousand
dollars in bills to pay the balance due the Merchants Bank. It
came back by the messenger, rejecting the check, by which their
balance of $25,000 still remained due, which the check if good
would have cancelled. Then the president told Ward to give them
specie credit instead of the check. The specie credit was not
given in satisfaction of the check, but of a general balance due
from the Atlantic to the Merchants'. This was no confirmation of
the act of Ward in taking this check.
So of the presentation of the check for payment; it was handed
to them by Ward as a valid security for what it purported to be, a
check by Peabody on the Merchants Bank. The only proper course
for them was to present it, and leave it for the defendants to determine whether they would pay it or not, and the protest was of no
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other effect than to get evidence of the presentmeht of the check
for payment, and the refusal of the defendant bank to pay it.
If the plaintiffs had acquired a right of action, there was no
waiver in not bringing it immediately. Nothing done or foreborne
by them was the caus of any loss or inconvenience to the defendants, and no act is shown waiving any right.
A case was cited after the argument, which, in its facts, bears
such a resemblance to the present, that it seems to deserve a separate consideration, though, upon a careful examination, it appears
to us to have been decided upon a principle not inconsistent with
the one hereby adopted. I..grahamvs. Maine Bank, 13 Mass. 208.
In order to compare the two cases, it is necessary to consider
who were the parties, and what was the question in the case cited.
It was a question, whether the sureties for the cashier's good behavior, on a bond given on June 1, were liable for the delinquency
complained of. The cashier was delinquent before June 1, and so
continued to October, when an examination of his cash was made
by the directors. To meet this, the cashier officially drew checks
on other banks, received the money, and placed it with his own, but
did not credit those other banks with the amount; his cash therefore appeared right. After the examination, he paid ihose other
banks out of the funds of his own bank, so that the transaction did
not appear on the books of his own bank, and his deficit, in fact,
stood as it did before June 1, when the bond was given. The question was, whether, at the time of the removal of the cashier, soon
after this last transaction, the deficit then existing was chargeable
to the obligors of the bond given June 1 ?
There the money was borrowed of other banks by the cashier, in
his official capacity and under his general authority, to bind his
bank by drafts, and it was responsible to those other banks,
although in the particular case, without any special authority or
,any exigency of the bank requiring it. This might have been an
act of misconduct on his part, though it would not impair the right
of the banks with whom he dealt, unless his unlawful purpose was
known to them, which is not suggested. The money thus raised
by their cashier on their credit, and mingled with their cash, was
their property in all respects; nobody could claim it by any prior
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title. The cashier's delinquency on that occasion consisted not in
drawing the money, but in failing to credit it to the bank from
which it was drawn, in order to deceive and mislead his employers.
Not having treated the banks of which he borrowed the money
as creditors of his bank, he regarded the drafts practically as a
personal loan to himself. When, therefore, he afterwards took the
funds of his bank, and, to pay these drafts, it was done to carry out
his fraud, to cancel his own debt, it was an unlawful embezzlement,
of the character of larceny practised then, and a violation of his
duty, amounting to a breach of the bond given June 1, so that the
sureties on that bond were liable.
The opinion of the Court is very short, and does not fully express
the grounds on which the judgment was rendered. The Court say,
that though a deficit existed before the execution of this bond, and
might have been covered by an antecedent bond, yet the taking of
money afterwards to pay what he had thus (clandestinely) borrowed, was also a breach of the condition of this bond. "For the
money, when placed in the vaults, became the property of the defendants" (the bank;) "and the transaction cannot be distinguished
from an actual payment from his own funds to supply the defalcttion, and a removal afterwards of the funds of the bank without
the consent of the defendants." It is -upon this last paragraph of
the judgment that we think it necessary to remark.
In that case, undoubtedly, the money was the property of the
bank, raised on their credit and placed with their funds. Besides
that, as against the cashier, and those responsible for him, it was
so far its property, that he would be estopped to deny it, and as
against them it would be the property of the bank. To take an
illustration from the present case. Suppose Hooper had had a secret
hoard of his own outside the bank, and had procured from that
$25,000, and placed it with his own for the examination of the
committee, and they for some cause had, after counting it, withheld it, and not returned it to him, he could not have reclaimed it,
-as against him the property would be held theirs. But if, instead
of such hoard of his own, he had fraudulently obtained it of another
person, it would not be theirs, in its true and proper sense, that is,
by a good and indefeasable title. But what is more decisive of the
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correctness of the judgment in that case is this : The Court intimate
that the facts taken together would perhaps prove a breach of both
bonds, that anterior and that subsequent to 1st June, and probably
they would. In that case the breach, by the prior misconduct,
would have caused no damage to the obligees, because by some
means, right or wrong, the loss occasioned by it had been repaired,
and the judgment must have been for nominal damages only.
Whereas, the breach by the subsequent misconduct, in wrongfully
withdrawing the funds of the bank, was the very breach by means
of which the obligees sustained their loss; and it was no answer by
the obligors on that bond that the misconduct of the cashier originated prior to the bond given by them.
In the last clause, the Court say, "the transaction cannot be distinguished from an actual payment from his own funds."
This shows .how necessary and important it is, in construing
judicial decisions, to consider them as made with a tacit reference
to the subject-matter, and the facts and circumstances of each case,
and with the limitations and qualifications implied thereby. The
Court say, the money when placed in the vaults by the cashier
became the property of the -bank. True, it did in that case, and
would in all cases as against the cashier who had so placed it for
such purpose; but they do not mean to say his placing it there,
however acquired, would make it absolutely theirs to all purposes;
such limitation was not expressed, because not necessary to that
case. So "the transaction could not be distinguished," &c.-it
was true as to that case, and with a view to the judgment to be
then rendered. The deficit under the first bond had been satisfied
by funds produced by the cashier, and which the bank was not answerable to any one else for, no actual damage had been sustained
by the bank, and if it could have a judgment, it would be for nominal damages, and would afford no defence or relief to the obligors
on the subsequent bond. For any purposes of that inquiry the
transaction was not distinguishable; but we are not, therefore, to
infer that the bank can hold it against the true owner, merely because the cashier paid it in, if he procured it by such means, that
the true owner might recover it back. The decision, therefore, is not
repugnant to the one we now make. Plaintiffs entitled to recover.

